2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

11-20-2012

USA v. Thomas;Thomas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Thomas;Thomas" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 137.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/137

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1285
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
THOMAS DARMEL THOMAS,
a/k/a Little Man
Thomas Darmel Thomas,
Appellant
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Criminal No. 06-cr-00322-001
(Honorable Yvette Kane)
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 13, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 20, 2012)
_________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Thomas Darmel Thomas appeals the District Court’s reduction in his sentence for
failure to explain its reasoning under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Because we conclude the

District Court was not required to reiterate its analysis under § 3553(a), provided at
Thomas’s original sentencing, we will affirm.
I.
In March, 2006, Thomas was speeding and driving erratically in Susquehanna
Township, Pennsylvania. When a police officer on routine patrol attempted to pull him
over, Thomas accelerated to speeds up to 100 miles per hour and began to weave back
and forth, eventually colliding with another vehicle. Medical personnel treating Thomas
at the scene discovered on him a loaded weapon, 35.41 grams of crack cocaine, $983 in
cash, and a small amount of marijuana.
A grand jury indicted Thomas on three drug trafficking and firearms charges.
Thomas signed a written plea agreement with the government, agreeing to plead guilty to
a single charge: possession with intent to distribute cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. §
841(a). 1 Under the 2006 Sentencing Guidelines, the District Court set Thomas’s base
offense level at 30. The court adjusted Thomas’s offense level to 31 after two-point
additions each for possessing a dangerous weapon and obstructing justice by fleeing from
a law enforcement officer and a three-point reduction for accepting responsibility. With a
criminal history category of VI, Thomas’s sentencing guideline range was 188-235
months. At the sentencing hearing, the court heard testimony that Thomas had obtained a
GED while incarcerated and also about his family history. The court sentenced Thomas
to 194 months’ imprisonment after addressing the § 3553(a) factors: “I think a sentence
1

Cocaine base, for the purposes of the guidelines, is defined as crack cocaine. U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1(c), n. (D); DePierre v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2225, 2236 (2011).
2

less than the maximum would protect the public from further crimes, provide him with
needed education and vocational training and adequately deter him, and at the same time
reflect the seriousness of the offense and promote respect for the law.”
The Sentencing Commission amended U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 in 2008 and 2011 to
give retroactive effect to reductions in offense levels for cocaine base offenses in
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Thomas then filed a pro se motion for sentence reduction under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and for a sentence below the amended guideline range because of his
rehabilitation, such as obtaining his GED and tutoring other inmates, and the unfairness
of the crack cocaine guidelines. The court appointed counsel for Thomas. Counsel moved
for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) to 155 months, three percent above the new
minimum sentence of 151 months, 2 just as Thomas’s original sentence had been three
percent above the then-minimum sentence. The government concurred in the request to
reduce Thomas’s sentence to 155 months, and the court granted the request. In granting
the request, the court stated it had considered the § 3553(a) factors.
Thomas appeals the sentence reduction, contending the court did not adequately
explain its reasoning under the § 3553(a) factors. 3
II.
Section 3582(c)(2) provides:
2

Under the amended guidelines, Thomas’s adjusted offense level, as a career offender,
was 29. Since Thomas had a criminal history category of VI, this resulted in a sentencing
guideline range of 151-188 months.
3
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review the District Court’s sentence
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mateo,
560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009).
3

[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment
based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion of the defendant or the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce the
term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to
the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
Section 3582(c)(2) has a “narrow scope.” Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683,
2691 (2010). It “does not authorize a sentencing or resentencing proceeding,” but only “a
limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence” when a guideline has been amended.
Id. at 2690-91. 4 There may be circumstances (when § 3553(a) factors are applicable)
where a district court should explain its rationale for a new sentence under § 3582(c)(2),
but a district court does not err by not doing so when it properly considered the relevant
factors at initial sentencing and, at resentencing, granted the defendant’s request to reduce
the sentence to one of comparable length to the initial sentence, relative to the applicable
guideline range. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 673-74 (5th Cir. 2009)
(holding a district court did not err by not mentioning the § 3553(a) factors at
resentencing when there was evidence it had considered them and the “the facts that led
to” the defendant’s initial high-end sentence remained at resentencing to a high-end

4

“When the Commission makes a Guidelines amendment retroactive, 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2) authorizes a district court to reduce an otherwise final sentence that is based
on the amended provision. Any reduction must be consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. The relevant policy statement, USSG §
1B1.10, instructs courts proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) to substitute the amended
Guidelines range while ‘leav[ing] all other guideline application decisions unaffected.’ §
1B1.10(b)(1). Under § 3582(c)(2), a court may then grant a reduction within the amended
Guidelines range if it determines that one is warranted ‘after considering the factors set
forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.’” Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2688.
4

sentence under the amended guidelines). 5
At Thomas’s initial sentencing hearing, the District Court addressed the § 3553(a)
factors and imposed a sentence three percent above the lower end of the guideline range.
After the guidelines were amended, the same court granted Thomas’s unopposed motion
to reduce his sentence to three percent above the lower end of the amended guideline
range. In doing so, the court stated it had considered the § 3553(a) factors. While the
court did not reiterate analysis of those factors, we will assume this was because that
analysis had not changed since initial sentencing. For example, Thomas’s pro se motion
emphasized his rehabilitation, including obtaining a GED and tutoring other inmates. But
at the initial sentencing hearing, the District Court had already heard evidence that
Thomas had obtained a GED while incarcerated. 6
We see no error here.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence.

5

Thomas’s reliance on United States v. Marion, 590 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2009) and United
States v. Howard, 644 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2011) is unavailing. In Marion, the District
Court denied defendant’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. In Howard, the District Court reduced
defendant’s sentence from the lower end of the guideline range to the midpoint of the
amended guideline range despite defendant’s request for a minimum sentence.
6
Thomas’s pro se motion also requested a sentence below the guideline range. Under §
3582(c)(2), the District Court has no authority to reduce a defendant’s term of
imprisonment to below the amended guideline range unless the defendant’s initial
sentence was below the previous guideline range. Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2692 (citing
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B)). Since Thomas’s initial sentence was not below the
guideline range, his reduced sentence could not be either.
5

